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Abstract 
A study was done to analyze impact of incentives on development of social 
forestry in the Matengo highlands in Tanzania. Data was obtained from synthesis 
and analysis of monthly and weekly field reports, and scrutiny of the empirical 
experiences learned as a result of researcher’s participation in the action research. 
Results indicated that incentives did not yield only expected positive outcomes, but 
also unexpected conflictual outcomes mainly due the fact that community is made up 
of social entities with diverse resources in form of thinking, meditation, purposes, 
interests etc, some wanting to use such resources in a way of meeting their personal 
ends at the expense of the public good. The unintended outcomes negatively impacted 
on the social forestry. It was recommended that understanding of the role of 
incentives, and attitudes of the actors under incentive environment, is imperative for 
decision making as regards improvement of social forestry or other community based 
environmental conservation initiatives.  
 
Keywords: community, environmental conservation, incentives, conflictual 
outcomes, heterogeneous community, Matengo, Tanzania. 
 
Introduction 
Various authors define incentives deferentially. As signals that drive 
certain action (Meijerink 1997); as inducement and incitement of an action 
(Enters 2001); as bribe or sweeteners (in the context of development projects) 
(Smith 1998); as policy instruments (Enters 1999) in the context that they are 
important for influencing and cultivating the implementation of policy 
objectives (Comerford 2004); and as positive and/or negative outcomes 
expected by people in their actions within certain working rules of their 
physical and social environments (Ostrom 1997, North 1994).  
                                                 
1Sokoine University of Agriculture Centre for Sustainable Rural Development, P.O. Box 3035, 
Chuo Kikuu, Morogoro Tanzania; Tel: 255-23-2604279; Mobile: 255-755-024289; Email: 
cpimahonge@yahoo.com or mahonge@suanet.ac.tz 
. 
Impact of Incentives in the Development of Social Forestry (C.P.I Mahonge) 
 
 
87 
Incentives are categorized as financial/monetary and non-monetary 
(Comerford 2004), material or non-material (Petersen et al. 2004, Ellingsen & 
Johannesson 2007), direct, indirect incentives and disincentives (Emerton 
1999, Comerford 2004). The direct incentives are mechanisms that are directed 
towards specific objectives for the intention of conditionally inciting 
conservation of the nature whereas the indirect incentives are mechanisms 
encouraging people to conserve environment by formulating some general 
enabling conditions. The disincentives are mechanisms that discourage people 
from doing certain actions (e.g. degrading natural resources) (Emerton 1999). 
Both direct and indirect incentives are important in stimulating investments 
and participation of the community and other non-governmental stakeholders 
in environmental management, and are interdependent (Enters et al. 2003).  
The use of incentives is by no means a new experience in conservation of 
natural resources around the world (Baker 1998). In essence, change of 
approach from state based to participatory natural resources management 
(e.g. in forest management) constructs around facilitating community’s 
participation in management of the resources by providing them with 
extrinsic incentives, which in-turn result into intrinsic motivation to 
participate in management of the resources (Bloomley & Ramadhani 2006, 
Baskent et al. 2008). They include materials incentives such as free tree 
seedlings, subsidizing forested land, sharing of benefits accrued from 
sustainable environmental friendly investments (e.g. ecotourism) at the local 
level, and restructuring of the institutional instruments (e.g. policies, 
legislation etc) at the higher policy levels (Giger 1999).  
Different views exist as regards the provision of direct incentives and 
their impacts on achieving the long-term outcomes, which are the primary 
purposes of many conservation-oriented projects. On the one hand, there is 
belief among project practitioners and researchers that the long-term project 
outcomes cannot be attained unless some short term benefits (direct 
incentives) are offered to the target groups (Douglas 1994). On the other hand, 
however, some evaluators have queried such a belief on the basis of evidence 
from empirical cases in which, although the short term benefits were 
provided, after the project time, the target group abandoned the long-term 
strategies (IFAD 1996, Pretty & Shaxon 1998, Hellin & Schrader 2003). Besides, 
the opponents further argue that there are empirical cases wherein outcomes 
have been achieved without providing direct incentives to the target group, or 
rather in the absence of the project approach as a whole. In addition, the 
opponents argue, the provision of incentives leads to consignment of the 
target group as beneficiaries instead of providers of the environmental 
services. In that case, the empowerment of the community, imperative for 
sustainability, is not achieved, leading to inability to achieve and sustain the 
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long-term benefits after the end of the projects (Giger 1999, Hellin & Schrader 
2003).  
While the incentives are important for social forestry development, the 
long-term nature of investment required for tree planting up to the realization 
of the benefits might hinder tree planting when there is a short term and more 
economically feasible alternative economic option, such as crop cultivation. 
Local people’s consideration of tree planting thus will come if the labour and 
capital investment for alternative livelihood is not likely to yield outstanding 
economic returns (Ubukata & Jamroenpruksa 1997, Salam et al. 2000).  
Although there is a growing research on impact of incentives on 
conservation of natural resources, there is still a limited knowledge on 
consequences of the same on the development of social forestry in Tanzania. 
The current study analyses the impact of a direct socio-economic incentive 
(the hydromill mini-project) on development of social forestry in the Matengo 
Highlands in Tanzania. The article is organized as follows: it first introduces 
the case study, then highlights the methodology used to collect the data, 
followed by an analysis on impacts of the hydromill project (an incentive) on 
the tree nursery management and planting, and finally to policy implications 
and conclusion sections.   
 
Social Forestry in Matengo Highlands in Tanzania 
In  2002, a three year (2002-2004) environmental management project was 
started in the Matengo Highlands. The project was a result of 
recommendations from Miombo Woodland Agro-ecological Research Project 
(MWARP) implemented from 1994 to 1997 through a partnership of Sokoine 
University of Agriculture (SUA), Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), Mbinga District, and the Matengo Highlands local community. The 
research had uncovered environmental degradation as one of the priority 
concerns in the area. The above-mentioned stakeholders resolved to initiate 
social forestry to rehabilitate the degraded environment by planting trees 
around the degraded areas, such as sources of water on the hilltops, and 
around the homesteads to provide people with alternative sources of wood 
for household consumption, to meet environmental and socioeconomic 
interests. To encourage participation in social forestry, an incentive was 
introduced. Based on the priority social economic problems uncovered from 
the research, milling service was another priority problem in the area. A 
hydromill project (an incentive) was thus initiated with the assumption that 
since it is operated by hydro-power, the local people would perceive the 
importance of conserving water and thus will participate actively in the social 
forestry. A tree nursery and hydromill micro-projects were therefore initiated, 
and the ownership was granted to the village community while other 
stakeholder facilitated the process. The hydromill project was run on service 
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provision basis whereby the community decided how much they would 
afford to pay for meeting operational costs of the project.  
Following the inception of the micro-projects, a committee was appointed 
to steer, monitor, and coordinate the projects activities. This committee was 
called Sengu and its members represented all institutions in the village (i.e. 
church, women, villagers, and village government). Sengu in Matengo context 
meant people originating from the same ancestor, coming and eating together, 
under the leadership of an elderly person, while discussing important issues 
(Nsenga et al. 2004). Naming the supervising committee in line with the 
traditionally recognized institutions meant recognition of potential for 
indigenousness. Training was given to the committee to build its capacity to 
undertake its roles effectively. The committee operated under the village 
government and had to regularly report the progress of the project’s activities 
to the village government, community, and to the stakeholders during the 
stakeholders meetings. While the committee undertook the supervisory, 
monitoring and coordinating roles, the whole village was accountable for the 
projects implementation and sustainability.  
The implementation process emphasized  community participation right 
from the onset of social forestry activities. The whole village approach was 
adopted with the assumption that participation of whole village community 
in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the initiatives 
with facilitation from non-local based stakeholders (CARITAS, SCSRD and 
District council), success of the initiative under question was highly 
guaranteed.  
The implementation of the projects at the outset seemed harmonious. 
However, two years later, things fell apart, and the source of the falling apart 
surrounded the incentive (hydromill). It is the aim of this study to uncover 
how the incentive affected the social forestry activity. 
 
Methodology  
This study is based on the field experiences through the two years (2002 to 
2004) action research project (SUA-JICA) that was conducted in the study 
area, the Matengo highlands. Records of various experiences and qualitative 
information by the researcher were complimented with monthly reports by 
other researchers, and the weekly reports that were composed by the Sengu 
committee during its weekly meetings to evaluate progress of the 
environmental management initiatives. The data was analyzed using the 
content analytical method.  
 
Impacts of Hydromill Project (Incentive)  
The hydromill mini-project derived both intended and unintended 
outcomes, as presented in Figure 1. However, this study is confined to the 
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analysis on how the unintended outcomes impacted on environmental 
conservation (tree nursery management and planting) in the Matengo 
highlands. The unintended outcomes of the hydromill project included power 
struggle, falsity, interpersonal hatred, conflict mongering and unstable 
leadership. Suffice it to mention nonetheless, that as always for any 
intervention, the unintended outcomes affect the intended ones. The projects 
or interventions try to identify and address them to make sure that they are 
made as positive as possible, or at least they cause minimum harm to the 
intervention. Although in practice it is hard to separate the unintended 
outcomes, for the matter of analysis they will be studied one by one. 
Hereunder the unintended outcomes are elaborated before analyzing their 
impact on social forestry at the Matengo highlands.  
 
Power Struggle 
Power, in the context of this is study, refers to attributes that a person or 
group of social actors possess and use to influence and alter actions and 
behaviours of other social actors (Pérez-Cirera & Lovett 2005). The inception 
of hydromill project has created various expectations among the people in the 
community. While others see the project as a rescue to the milling problems 
they have had for a long time, some of them, especially the local elite, think 
about how they might capture the intervention for their personal benefits. 
Their exclusion in the supervising committee, therefore, makes them devise 
counteractions against the committee. Knowing that they cannot easily 
dismiss the committee, they plot mechanisms to persuade and stir some other 
actors who may have a stake in the project. In this process they use the 
authoritative organs, pretentiously expressing their concern as the possible 
undesirable fate they are going to face and which will endanger their 
positions due to the actions of the committee. This was learned in the 
following response from the sengu committee: 
 
Some ex-village leaders and the hardliners2 stirred up and persuaded the 
village leaders that if they were not careful the sengu committee was going 
to overpower them and people might vote them out during the coming 
elections; and as the committee was becoming very strong they might 
select the sengu committee members into village government. They told 
them that the sengu committee was starting to make decisions beyond 
their boundary of jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
2 For the context of this study, a hardliner is a person who is conflict lover, conflict stirrer, inquisitive, 
gossiper, close monitor, with high convincing power, is able to manipulate facts to mislead others, could 
be a person with wider exposure; he might have worked outside the village and/or even in towns; he could 
be a local elite. 
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The struggle for power seems to be one of the reasons for this movement. 
The ex-leaders and hardliners might have anticipated the possibility of their 
being appointed into the committee if the government dismissed the sengu 
members due to the concern and generosity they have expressed to the village 
leaders. They don’t show this openly, nonetheless, but they bury their hidden 
agenda within the shoes of the village leaders.  They pretend to be concerned 
with fate of others while trying to undermine the participatory initiative to 
suit their own ends at the expense of the majority (Baland & Platteau 1999). 
 
Figure 1:  Intended and Unintended Outcomes of Incentives  
to Environmental Management. 
 
Falsity  
Personal interests to the hydromill project (the incentive) cultivated the 
spirit of telling lies among some individuals in the social forestry projects at 
the Matengo highlands. Lying is used as a weapon to undermine and 
humiliate others seeming to be committed in facilitating achievement of the 
majority interests in the participatory work. These messages concerned 
sensitive issues that could incite actions against the committee by the 
authoritative organs and community in the village. For example, the 
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hardliners and ex-leaders spread the message that the donor (JICA) had 
issued Tanzanian shillings one millions to facilitate environmental 
rehabilitation, but that money was shared among the members of the 
committee to meet their personal provisions. Although this was a lie the 
village government could not take part in analyzing the truth behind it. Lies 
can cause great harm to the participatory intervention. This becomes critically 
the case when the trust is made between the informers and informed such 
that the informed do not take time to search truth behind the received 
messages.   
 
Interpersonal Hatred 
In social life, it is practically inevitable to avoid interpersonal conflicts 
among the community3. It might be because of the diversity of behaviour and 
preferences among the individuals (Kumar & Kant 2007). Interpersonal 
conflicts might also originate from some past interactions in resource use 
where one or some of users felt discontented with the relationship (Christie et 
al. 2003a). Other possible cause of the interpersonal conflicts is jealousy 
(Qashu 1999). It is worse when the interpersonal hatred transcends the 
personal boundary and endangers the attainment of the public good. In the 
social forestry at the Matengo highlands this proved to be the case. Some 
individuals from the community had personal conflicts with individuals in 
sengu committee and, at the expense of the common good, engineered 
underground movements to shame the committee members, without even 
thinking through the effects on the project as a whole. This indicates that 
when people are encouraged to participate as a group in the social forestry 
programme they are not in practice as a single unit, but rather as individual 
entities bound together by the common purpose. They, therefore, carry their 
individual behaviours, attitudes and preferences with them into the 
participatory arrangements. Understanding of this can be an important clue 
for understanding causal outcome relationship among the parties that in one 
way or another come into conflicts; in fact it might assist in determining a 
solution for the cause rather than for the outcome, thus salvaging the 
participatory effort (Christie et al. 2003a). 
 
Conflict Mongering  
This is a tendency whereby an individual or a group of persons stir others 
into conflicts by pretending to sympathize with one of the parties for the 
potential unpleasant consequences likely to hit another party. It is especially 
the case when the conflict mongers envisage that their movement will 
potentially result in punishment, disgrace or shaming of an individual or a 
                                                 
3 http://www.timbersnursery.com/11.doc  
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party they hate. While conflicts are commonly inevitable in societies, it is 
astonishing to see conflict mongers happy in devising instruments of disgrace 
for other innocent actors and at the expanse of public benefits. Such a 
situation was evidenced in the case of environmental conservation in the 
Matengo highlands, whereby the ex-village leaders and the hardliners’ 
personal hatred toward Sengu committee stirred up conflict between the 
committee and the village government on the one hand, and the committee 
and the village community on the other. Conflict mongering may result in 
punishment and humiliation of individuals or parties that are innocent. Sengu 
committee in the present case, for example, was consequently humiliated and 
dismissed from its jurisdiction, only later to find that what was done against 
them was unjust.   
 
Unstable Leadership 
Leadership is a very important attribute for showing the way. The role 
played by the leaders in the community based initiatives is one of the crucial 
determinants for achieving the desired ends or failure in realizing the same 
(Meizen-Dick & Knox 1999, Sangita 2008). Ideally, to become a good leader, 
one quality virtue is embodiment of rational judgment and analysis of the 
situation to avoid asymmetry and personal attributes in addressing emerging 
circumstances for a common good. When the leadership is destabilized, this 
weakness is turned into an opportunity by opportunists to fulfil their personal 
interests. While the ends of the few selfish actors are guaranteed in such 
situations those of the public fade away. Leadership instability is one of the 
critical reasons for falling apart of the social forestry activities at the Matengo 
Highland. Instead of considering the veracity or falsity of the message from 
the conflict mongers, the leaders listened to the lies, and consequently acted 
incorrectly against the sengu committee. Seekers of personal interests know 
and use the unstable leaders as a ladder to achieve their personal ends. 
Nonetheless, when things have gone wrong, these individuals shy away, 
leaving the leaders to be blamed for any errors.  
 
Impacts of the Interplay of Unintended Outcomes of Hydromill on Social 
Forestry 
The impacts of the interplay of the unintended outcomes of the hydromill 
incentive are presented in Figure 2, and can be outlined as: 
• Suspension of the Sengu committee and appointment of government 
sub-committee; 
• Poor performance of the environmental conservation endeavour. 
The deterioration of the environmental conservation endeavour triggered:  
• Call of the stakeholders meeting to discuss the situation; 
• Restoration of the Sengu committee.   
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Figure 2: Impacts of Interplay of Unintended Outcomes of Hydromill 
Incentive on Social Forestry  
 
Dismissal of the Sengu Committee and Appointment of Government Sub-
Committee 
The unintended outcomes resultantly managed to influence decision 
making of the government, and the voting power of the villagers. Through 
the village assembly, the Sengu committee was voted out and declared as 
“dismissed”. At this point the sengu opponents had accomplished one of their 
missions; the second one could probably be their appointment by the 
government to become overseers of the project and thus justify their 
accessibility to the hydromill project (access the revenues). Nonetheless, 
contrary to this likelihood, the government appointed itself to form a sub-
committee for overseeing the hydromill and tree planting activities. In other 
words, the village government appointed some of its members to form a new 
supervising committee. Such appointment nonetheless was unethical in view 
of the regulations the stakeholders had laid down. If the government itself 
supervised the project, to whom would it be accountable? The implication of 
Village assembly 
Hardliners  Ex-village leaders Village 
government 
Village 
community 
Village government sub-
committee 
D
ism
iss 
A
ppoint 
Poor environmental 
conservation overseeing 
Stakeholders meeting 
R
es
to
re
 
Note: Dotted line indicates alliance. Full line indicates influence or outcome. 
Sengu committee 
Impact of Incentives in the Development of Social Forestry (C.P.I Mahonge) 
 
 
95 
the government appointing itself was that the right of the people participating 
and assuming ownership of the initiative was eliminated. This therefore 
disrupted the whole concept of the community based natural resources 
management and brought to the village the centralized natural resource 
management, which had already failed. The historic experiences of the failed 
village projects (e.g. village shops, milling machines etc.) and mismanagement 
of funds under village government management roused further scepticism for 
government’s decision4.  
Hydromill revenues, but not tree planting, attracted the government 
members to intervene in the project. A few days after its appointment, the 
village sub-committee started to raise the concern that the work of 
supervising the social forestry was difficult, and they should thus be 
considered for some remuneration. It might appear that the government 
members had intrinsically longed for intervening into the project, and the 
sengu accusation just gave them avenue for operationalizing their desire.  
Even though they had displaced sengu committee nonetheless, the funds 
could not be accessed because of the trust and legitimacy the bookkeeper had 
before the local people, and even among the government itself. Being a church 
leader (Father), and based on the trust he had acquired in the community, he 
continued to keep the hydromill revenues even when the former sengu 
committee had been dismissed.    
This impact shows us how diverse the community is. Various interests, 
expectations, thinking, preferences attitude towards the incentive is the 
central problem among the resource users on the community side, and 
between the community and the government scale. This reality was concealed 
at the outset because the intervention was made through participatory 
negotiations between the local actors (the village government and the 
community) and other stakeholders (the Sokoine University of Agriculture, 
the JICA, and Mbinga district council). The local stakeholders thus might have 
not preferred to express their differences while the external actors were with 
them. The reality becomes explicit at the implementation stage, when the local 
community and government assume primary authority to manage the social 
forestry and hydromill projects. While the unfolding reality on the one hand 
indicates how diverse the community is in terms of their preferences, 
behaviour, thinking, purposes etc., on the other side, shows how hard it might 
be for the non-place actors to understand the community when planning for 
participatory natural resources management, as the present case has 
indicated.  
  
 
                                                 
4 Informal communication with elders in the village 
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Poor Performance of the Social Forestry Work 
Desire for hydromill revenues appears to have prompted jumping into a 
decision of supervising social forestry activities, but at the same time the 
capacity of doing so was low among the government sub-committee 
members. While the deterioration of the social forestry and hydromill projects 
became evident and escalated as days went by, it was not easy for the 
government to acknowledge that it had undertaken an irrational decision, and 
that it had failed to manage the social forestry and hydromill activities. 
Acknowledging a failure is like a father telling his child “I am sorry”—
something not common in many societies. However, nothing could be 
concealed in the eyes of the local people as they could witness frequent 
breakdowns of the hydromill and poor performance of the tree nursery along 
with the incapacity of the government sub-committee to take decisions and 
follow them up. As the local people started questioning the rationality of 
sacking sengu committee after perceiving that they were misinformed, the 
deteriorating situation triggered stakeholders to call for meetings to address 
the situation. Through the negotiation process and having experientially felt 
the problems, the sengu committee was restored to the jurisdiction of 
overseeing social forestry and hydromill projects.   
The use of local people as a ladder to achieve some personal interests of a 
few individuals is what appears in the present impact. The local people were 
misinformed about the sengu committee and persuaded to vote it out. They 
had thus been used to meet the demands of a few individuals, though again 
they had ultimately to suffer the consequences. Although when voting out the 
committee that outcome could not be predicted, the poor performance of the 
new government sub-committee revealed the reality. It now became easy to 
convince the community after stakeholders meeting to accept the restoration 
of sengu; this is a vivid example of ‘learning through practice’. It needs not 
much argument for people to see the value and importance of a certain 
institution to them when they can easily ascertain this from the practical 
reality. In other words, although some deadlock can occur in the participatory 
work, it can give people lessons of dealing with future contradictory 
situations. 
 
Policy Implications  
While incentives are used in social forestry development, it is not 
guaranteed that the use of the incentives exclusively brings out what is 
expected. The expected outcomes in most cases are associated with 
unintended ones. The unintended outcomes of the incentives, if positive, can 
contribute to the improvement of the intended outcomes or even bring new 
positive outcomes in addition to the intended ones. On the other side, 
however, negative unintended outcomes can lead to the disruption of the 
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intended goals of the initiative as a whole.  Policy makers and development 
practitioners need to underscore that the community is not unique but 
diverse, made up of social entities of different interests, thinking, purposes, 
power structure etc. no matter how much effort is invested to artificially put it 
together. While these resources can be important for dealing with 
unpredictable challenges that may compromise the achievement of the 
anticipated goals, they are on the side likely to be applied in selfish and 
conflictual ways, at least by some individuals, resulting in marginalizing 
others and causing destructive outcomes to any participatory initiative. 
Decision makers on the application of the incentives in participatory 
management therefore need to be aware of these potentials.  The challenging 
question could nonetheless be “what should be done to reduce or rather turn 
the negative influences of the incentives into positive inducements, and thus 
improve the outcome of the intervention?” This can perhaps not have a single 
answer. For this research for example, the stakeholders’ negotiation worked, 
at least, to terminate the deadlock and restore participatory spirit, though 
further follow-up would be required as to what transpired in practice after the 
negotiation process. Nonetheless, this is sometimes achieved after some 
experiential ‘learning by doing’ process. In essence, any sort of participatory 
decision-making or problem solving process should be encouraged. Since 
conflicts occur between or among the people, the same people can attain the 
solution to the conflicts even though an outside facilitator may be required.  
 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded from the present study that incentives do not 
necessarily, nor exclusively, bring the intended outcomes, but that they can 
lead to a mix of intended and unintended (desirable and/or undesirable) 
outcomes. This is primarily due to differentiated and sometimes implicit 
attitudes of individuals of a specific social community towards the incentives 
and the purpose they are planned to serve. Conflictual outcomes could 
however be used as challenges rather than impediments, thus enabling 
improved achievement of the planned endeavour. More underscoring of 
intermix between incentives to achieving a particular goal and factual 
achievement of the same is imperative especially in the community based 
environmental management or similar endeavours. Understanding of the 
role of incentives and attitudes of the actors under an incentive environment 
is an imperative key that can be used by decision makers for strategizing 
effective and sustainable community based environmental conservation 
initiatives.  
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